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COMMENTS

ENVIRONMENTAL WATER LAW

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972: The equitable discretion of federal courts to curtail violations of federal acts through the
use of the injunction. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct.
1798 (1982).
INTRODUCTION

On March 1, 1978, the Governor of Puerto Rico filed suit in the Federal
District Court to enjoin the United States Navy from using Vieques Island
as an air-to-ground weapons training ground. I The Navy had begun using
the Island of Vieques and the surrounding area for extensive weapons
training in the early 1970s. As a result, bombing and shelling ordnance
2
was discharged into the water surrounding Vieques on a regular basis.
The Governor claimed that the bombing violated numerous federal
environmental statutes including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA). 3 The district court found that the Navy violated the FWPCA
by failing to obtain an NPDES permit 4 which would have allowed the
discharge of ordnance into the waters surrounding Vieques Island.'
The NPDES permit system is the method by which Congress controls
water quality.6 The permit process allows discharge of pollutants only
after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has approved the dis-7
charge as meeting legally established water pollution control standards.
1. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D.P.R. 1979), rev'd sub nom, Romero-Barcelo
v.Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct.
1798 (1982).
2. Brief for Respondents at 5, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as FWPCA).
4. NPDES permit is a commonly used acronym for a National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System permit, provided for in 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
5. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. at 705.
6. "There can be no doubt that the most effective control mechanism for point source of discharge
is one which will provide for the establishment of conditions of effluent control for each source of
discharge. A permit or equivalent program . . . should provide for the most expeditious water
pollution elimination program." S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong. Ist Sess. 72 (1971). With the 1972
amendments as to the FWPCA, the permit system replaced water quality as the measure for pollution
control. "Water quality will be a measure of program effectiveness and performance, not a means
of elimination and enforcement." Id. at 8.
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1976).
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By defining pollutants broadly and giving EPA review over the discharge
of pollutants, all sources of possible harmful pollution are monitored.
Since the whole pollution control scheme depends on the permit process
under the FWPCA,
no discharge of pollutants are allowed without an
8
NPDES permit.
According to the clear language of the statute, the Navy was discharging
pollutants without an NPDES permit. 9 However, the district court did
not enjoin the Navy from its continued use of the Island as a weapons
training ground but ordered 0the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit
"with all deliberate speed. "' The court found that compliance with the
act could be accomplished by its order to apply for a permit, without
issuing an injunction in the interim. The injunction would have curtailed
the Navy's training activity until the permit was obtained.
In deciding not to issue an injunction, the district court concluded that
under a traditional balancing of equities, the public interest in the training
activities and the national security it produced outweighed the slight
environmental impact that the bombing had on the ecology surrounding
the Island." Thus, an injunction was not appropriate in this situation,
although under the clear2 mandate of the FWPCA a permit was required
,to continue operations. '
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court
to enter an order insuring that the Navy would stop discharging ordnance
into the coastal waters of Vieques until they either obtained an NPDES
permit or a presidential exemption from the NPDES requirements. ' 3 In
so holding, the First Circuit found that the district court was incorrect in
applying a traditional balancing approach when faced with a clear, continuing violation of a federal statute, Instead, under Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill (TVA), 4 Congress' prohibition against discharging pollutants without a permit should have been the controlling factor in shaping
relief and should have mandated an immediate abatement, in the form
of an injunction, of any continuing violation. 15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address the question
of whether the FWPCA curtails the federal courts' traditional equitable
functions when they are designing relief from violations of the statute. 16
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
9. Munitions are explicitly included in the definition of pollutant. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976).
10. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. at 708.
11. Id. at 706-708.
12. Id. at 708.
13. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 862 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom, Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982). 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (Supp. III 1979) allows the
President to exempt governmental agencies from compliance with the NPDES permit process upon
finding that it is of "paramount interest to the United States to do so."
14. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
15. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d at 861-62.
16. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. at 1800 (1982).
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The Court concluded that absent a clear congressional manifestation of
intent to alter the federal courts' discretion in shaping equitable remedies,
the courts may balance. The Supreme Court found no such intent in the
FWPCA. Therefore, the district court was correct in balancing7 the equities
when granting relief from continuing violations of the act. '
BACKGROUND
The injunction is an equitable remedy which has been traditionally used
to curtail an activity which threatens immediate and irreparable harm to
the person seeking relief. 18 In granting this type of prohibitory relief, a
doctrine of weighing equities has arisen in which the court balances the
countervailing hardships which may be suffered by one or the other parties
in the granting or denying of an injunction. 19
The injunction, in modem times, is not only used as a method of
solving private disputes, but is also utilized as a means to immediately
curtail illegal activity. A conflict arises when the injunction is used in a
statutory context. The court is faced with an absolute duty of enforcing
a legislative mandate with a judicial tool which in theory depends on a
discretionary balancing of equities. Thus a court may have a duty to stop
a continuing violation of a statute while finding that to do so would be
more detrimental than allowing the violation to continue.
Arguably, the abatement of statutory violations by injunction calls for
a different balancing approach than that taken in a private action. 20 This
theory presumes that a legislative body balances the equities before declaring that a certain activity is a statutory violation. Thus priorities of
behavior are set according to legislative balancing of public interests and
hardships. 2 1 The court's duty is not to reweigh the hardships but to enforce
the statute in the most effective manner. A court does not have equitable
discretion in setting priorities of behavior but retains discretion in deciding
how best to enforce the policies set by the statute. 22 Thus the court still
has equitable discretion in granting an injunction. But, that discretion is
limited to deciding whether an injunction is necessary to stop further
violations of the act.
Until Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo23 the Supreme Court had never
explicitly decided what part congressional enactments play in shaping the
17. Id. at 1807.
18. 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE

§ 1338 (5th ed. 1941).

19. Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF EQUrrY § 144 (2d ed. 1948).

20. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524 (1982).
21. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 601-10 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
22. See Plater, supra note 20. Steven's dissent in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo follows this
line of reasoning in upholding the Court of Appeals decision.
23. 102 S.Ct. 1798 (1982).
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federal courts' equitable discretion. In Hecht Co. v. Bowles 24 the Supreme
Court in highly ambiguous language recognized that congressional acts
prohibiting certain activities have some sort of impact on equitable discretion. 25 What that impact is has remained unclear. Some decisions have
suggested that congressional enactments merely represent a stated public
26
policy to be given consideration in a traditional balancing of equities.
Others have recognized that legislation restricts the discretion of the courts
only what remedy will best effectuate Congress' stated polto deciding
icy. 27 In any event, no Supreme Court decision under any theory has
allowed a violation of a statute to continue until Romero-Barcelo.
ANALYSIS
With Romero-Barcelo, nearly thirty years after Hecht, the Supreme
Court has chosen the direction it will take concerning the weight to be
given congressional pronouncements of public policy. The Supreme Court's
position is that unless Congress clearly expresses its intention to limit the
exercise of judicial discretion, a traditional balancing approach by the
federal courts will be followed. 28 According to the Supreme Court's
analysis, courts must initially decide when Congress has given a clear
indication of intent to limit judicial discretion in deciding what activity
shall be curtailed by injunction. The Court gives us a hint of their analysis
by distinguishing TVA v. Hill 29 from the case at bar.
In TVA, the Court found that a "flat ban on the destruction of critical
habitats" under the Endangered Species Act 30 foreclosed judicial discretion exercised by the federal courts when granting injunctions. 3' The
24. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
25. "The Court's . . . discretion . . . must be exercised in light of the larger objectives of the
Act. For the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the
propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases." Id. at 331.
26. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Winner, The Chancellor's
Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions,
9 ENVTL. L. 477, 506-10 (1979).
27. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). For a general discussion
of the cases between Hecht and Romero-Barcelo see Plater, supra note 14, at 559-83.
28. 102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803-04 (1982).
29. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). TVA involved the fate of an endangered species of fish called the snail
darter. The snail darter's only habitat was in a part of the Little Tennessee River which was to be
completely inundated by a reservoir created by the completion of the Tellico Dam. The Tellico Dam
was a public works project begun by the TVA in 1967 for a multitude of purposes including generating
electricity, and providing recreation and flood control. The completion of the dam would have
destroyed the specialized habitat on which the snail darter's survival depended. Id. 157-62.
30. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). The provision which
the Court finds conclusive of Congressional intent to preclude judicial discretion is section 1536.
"All other Federal departments and agencies shall . . . insure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of (any) endangered species . . . or
result in the destruction of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to be critical."
31. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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district court was precluded from deciding between the public importance
of the Tellico Dam and the snail darter. Congress had already balanced
the equities. It chose the snail darter over the dam.
In Romero-Barcelo, however, the Supreme Court confronted a slightly
different statutory approach. The FWPCA does not absolutely bar pollution; it bars pollution without an NPDES permit. 32 The Court found
this distinction significant in ascertaining congressional intent. Since Congress did not ban all pollution it has not set fixed priorities of behavior
which would foreclose an equitable balancing. The Supreme Court validated the district court's actions by ordering the court of appeals to
review the district court's balancing for abuse of discretion. 33 The district
court was allowed to measure the public harm that this violator committed
by his pollution and balance that harm against the public harm which
might result if the injunction were granted.
While distinguishing between the Endangered Species Act and the
FWPCA, the Court disregarded the fact that Congress flatly banned the
activity engaged in by the Navy-polluting without a permit. 3 4 The Court
has further allowed the violation of a federal environmental act to continue
while steps are taken to comply with the statute.3 5 The Court suggests
that it will allow continuing violations for a short period of time when
ordering compliance, if the Court finds that the violation will not "appreciably harm" a public interest (here the environment) and that the
compliance will be forthcoming. 36 In fact, the Court is acknowledging
the public policy behind the statute, water pollution control, while disregarding the regulatory scheme of the statute, the fact that a violation
has and will continue to occur.
Secondly, the Court, in examining the statutory scheme for dealing
with water pollution by phased compliance, found Congress' intent to be
flexible in regard to water pollution. This is evidenced by the permit
process itself and by the discretion allowed the Environmental Protection
Agency to shape remedial consent orders .37 The Court has extended the
32. "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and
1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (1976). Section 1342 provides for the issuance of a permit "for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding § 1311 (a).
33. Justice Powell in his concurrence reviewed the District Court's action for abuse of discretion
and would have affirmed their decision. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 50 U.S.L.W. 4434, 4438
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
34. "The Amendments established a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone
to discharge pollutants into the Nation's water except pursuant to a permit." Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1981).
35. "In essence, the District Court's remedy was a judicial permit exempting the Navy's operations
in Vieques from the statute until such time as it could obtain a permit .
102 S. Ct. at 1809
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. 102 S.Ct. at 1807 (1982).
37. Id. at 1805-06 (1982).
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flexibility granted to the Environmental Protection Agency in enforcement
to include judicial equitable discretion. The courts are thus given the
ability to independently weigh the environmental impact of a pollution
source before the Environmental Protection Agency (the agency with the
expertise to make such an investigation) has an opportunity to examine
the environmental impact. In practical effect, this gives a violator two
levels of review, one by the district court in shaping its remedy to insure
compliance and one by the Environmental Protection Agency in the NPDES
permit process-the review contemplated by Congress.
Finally, the Court effectively disposes of the argument that the presidential exemption provision of the FWPCA is the exclusive method of
exemption under the Act. 38 The Supreme Court stated that it was not
exempting the violator from compliance but merely allowing the violation
to continue temporarily until compliance is achieved. 39 The difference is
a matter of semantics. The President may grant an exemption for up to
one year with extensions thereafter from the permit process upon a finding
of paramount public interest. 40 The courts, after this opinion, can grant
a "temporary" exemption while the violator takes steps to comply with
the statute. The court need only find that a countervailing public hardship
would result if an injunction were granted. 4 Both approaches allow
temporary noncompliance. The one significant difference is, if the violator
is unsuccessful in gaining a permit from the Environmental Protection
Agency under court order, the court will need to reconsider its original
decision in granting relief. On the other hand, no further action is necessary once the President has granted an exemption.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Romero-Barcelo has important implications concerning the continued
enforcement of the FWPCA as well as all other environmental acts. The
decision explicitly allows district courts to perform an equitable balancing
under the FWPCA when faced with a continuing violation of the Act.
Thus, in a case where the pollution is potentially more hazardous than
in Romero-Barcelo, the district court is left with the task of finding facts
of a technical nature concerning harm to the environment. Until a permit
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1976 and Supp. 1111979).
39. 102 U.S. at 1806 (1982).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1976 and Supp. II1 1979).
41. The irony is that a court's temporary exemption may last longer than a year. That is certainly
true in this case. After the Supreme Court decided Romero-Barcelo the Navy filed with EPA for a
permit. However, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has refused to issue a water quality certificate.
Without such a certificate, the EPA will not issue a NPDES permit. The Navy is presently seeking
to have the denial of the certificate overturned in U.S. district court. See United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 82-0726, slip op. (D.P.R. Nov. 16, 1982).
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is granted or denied by the Environmental Protection Agency, the district
court is allowed to substitute its non-expert findings in place of the Environmental Protection Agency's expertise concerning water pollution
control. Furthermore, the only review of the district court's decision by
an appellate court will be for abuse of its equitable discretion. In effect,
a district court's decision allowing continued violations of the FWPCA
may, if erroneous, result in devastating harm to the environment until the
permit is denied and the pollution is finally curtailed.
The implication of this decision to other environmental acts is also
important. The Supreme Court presumes that Congress does not intend
to restrict the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Supreme
Court is thus telling Congress that a statute's policy enunciation is only
one of many factors courts need consider when weighing equitable considerations. Behavior condemned by Congress may not automatically be
enjoined by the judiciary.
Further, it is difficult to predict from TVA and Romero-Barcelo in what
statutory patterns the Supreme Court is likely to find clear congressional
intent to curtail equitable discretion. Congress' definite setting of priorities
under the Endangered Species Act between the importance of the snail
darter's habitat over the Tellico Dam and the extremely flexible phased
compliance scheme of water pollution in Romero-Barcelo represent two
ends of a spectrum. A host of statutory schemes will have to be litigated
in order to bring into sharper focus how the Supreme Court will continue
congressional intent. After Romero-Barcelo, however, the possibility remains that Supreme Court construction of congressional intent in other
environmental statutes will depend on the environmental policies of the
court making the determination.
JUDI SCHRANDT

